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COMMENTS
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MERETRICIOUS
SPOUSES: THE EFFECT OF THE NEW "NO
PUNISHMENT" POLICY INDICATED BY THE

CONSENTING ADULTS BILL*
The sole question for decision is whether a woman has
thus, by further defilement of her own character, knowingly formed an illicit alliance with an unmoral and degraded wretch, may enforce her claim to a share in the
acquets and gains of her paramour accumulated during the
years of her debasement.'
INTRODUCTION

An individual' who cohabits with another person knowing
that the two are not married is a meretricious spouse.' The
property rights of meretricious spouses in California have been
defined in large part by two California Supreme Court deci5
sions, Vallera v. Vallera4 and Keene v. Keene. Under Vallera
and Keene, meretricious spouses have not been permitted to
claim, by analogy to a valid marriage, half the property accumulated during the relationship.' Thus, their remedies for obtaining an interest in accumulated property have been very
limited. Vallera and Keene allow meretricious cohabitors to
As this issue went to press the CaliforniaSupreme Court decision was filed in
Marvin v. Marvin, No. 30520 (Cal. Sup. Ct., decided Dec. 27, 1976). In Marvin the
court concluded that express and implied contracts, partnershipor joint venture agreements, and other tacit understandings between meretriciousspouses will be enforced.
The majority specifically authorized the use of the doctrine of quantum meruit and
constructive or resulting trusts where warranted. Id., slip op. at 2. The reasoningof In
re Marriageof Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345 (1973), was disapproved. Id. at 35. In light of
the problems trial courts will face in applying Marvin, the discussion in this Comment of earlier cases and the Consenting Adults Bill may offer useful guidance.
*

1. Vallera v. Vallera, 126 P.2d 639 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (vacated).
2. Plaintiffs of both sexes have had their property rights partially determined by
their meretricious status. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d
64 (1958) (male meretricious spouse). Because most of the meretricious spouses in
California cases have been women, however, and for purposes of convenience, feminine
pronouns are used throughout this Comment where the reference is not to a specific
spouse.
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 349, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862,
864 (1973). See note 19 infra.

4.
5.
6.
595-96

21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657,662, 371 P.2d 329, 331-32, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
(1962); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1943).
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recover only on the basis of express agreements to pool and
share property, or funds contributed toward the purchase of the
accumulated assets at issue.' Several other forms of recovery
were disallowed.'
In 1973, a California appellate court decision, In re Marriage of Cary,9 broke from the Vallera-Keene rule. The First
District Court of Appeal concluded that it was forced to deviate
from the accepted Valera-Keene doctrine because of a legislative policy change reflected in the 1970 Family Law Act."' The
Cary court pointed out that the reason for the California decisions regarding the property rights of meretricious spouses had
been the courts' reluctance to grant relief to parties engaged in
a "sinful" relationship." With the passage of the Family Law
Act of 1970, the Cary majority held, property division could no
longer be refused to a meretricious spouse engaged in a
"family-type" relationship: the Family Law Act had announced a new public policy which eliminated "sinfulness" or
"guilt" of the parties as a consideration in determining family
property rights, and thereby undercut the rationale of the
2
Vallera-Keene rule.'
The Cary decision has been criticized as a misinterpretation of the Family Law Act. 3 Critics offer convincing arguments that the legislature did not intend to allow meretricious
spouses to recover under the provisions of the act, 4 and two
subsequent court of appeal decisions have rejected the Cary
5
reasoning.'
While it appears that the Family Law Act does not require
a change in California rules regarding meretricious spouses,
7. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 662, 371 P.2d 329, 331-32, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
595-96 (1962); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1943).
8. See notes 79-98 and accompanying text infra.
9. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
10. Id. at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
11. Id. at 349-50, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
12. Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
13. Brief for H. Kay, J. Sutter & D. Walker as Amicus Curiae at 29-49, Marvin
v. Marvin, appeal docketed, No. 30520, Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited
as Amicus Briefl; Comment, In re Cary:A JudicialRecognition of Illicit Cohabitation,
25 HAST. L.J. 1226, 1232-42 (1974); Comment, In re Marriageof Carey [sic]: The End
of the Putative-MeretriciousSpouse Distinctionin California, 12 S.D.L. REv. 436, 44048 (1975); Note, In re Marriageof Cary: Equitable Rights Granted to the Meretricious
Spouses, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 187, 193-99 (1974).
14. Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 29-30; Comment, In re Cary: A Judicial
Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25 HAST. L.J. 1226, 1235 (1974); Comment, In re
Marriage of Carey [sic]: The End of the Putative-MeretriciousSpouse Distinction in
California, 12 S.D.L. REV. 436, 448 (1975); Note, In re Marriage Of Cary: Equitable
Rights Granted to the Meretricious Spouses, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 187, 199 (1974).
15. See notes 138-43 and accompanying text infra.
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there is a definite possibility that the legislature may have
undermined the Vallera-Keene doctrine when it passed the
Consenting Adults Bill, Assembly Bill Number 489,16 in the
spring of 1975.
The Consenting Adults Bill removes criminal sanctions
from certain forms of private consensual sexual behavior and
adulterous cohabitation. 7 In passing the bill, the legislature
seems to have formally recognized that personal relationships
between consenting adults are in an area of privacy where the
government should not intrude."8 It follows that the state no
longer has a legitimate concern with the "sinfulness" of a meretricious union when determining whether the parties have valid
property rights arising out of the relationship.
The purpose of this comment is to assess the potential
effect of the new "no punishment" policy of the Consenting
Adults Bill on California's laws regarding meretricious spouses.
The supreme court and appellate court cases dealing with meretricious spouses will be analyzed in order to illustrate the
court's reliance on prejudice and social policy that are no longer
appropriate or valid." The reasoning of these cases will be reexamined, and changes necessary to bring this segment of California law into conformity with the state's new "no punishment" policy will be suggested.
THE VALLERA-KEENE RULE

California community property laws award one half the
community property accumulated during marriage to each
spouse upon a marital dissolution.'" By analogy to the community property system, the right to half the property accumulated during the relationship through the joint efforts of the
parties has been extended to those persons who thought they
were married, but who subsequently discovered that their mar16. Cal. Stats. (1975), ch. 71, at 144 (West Leg. Serv.).
17. Id.
18. See notes 148-52 and accompanying text infra.
19. The view that the California Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal hold of unmarried cohabitors is inherent in the legal term by which they are
described, "meretricious." The word "meretricious" has been defined as:
(1) of or relating to a prostitute: having a harlot's traits . . . . [or]
(2) exhibiting synthetic or spurious attractions: based on pretense or
insincerity: cheaply ornamental.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (P. Gove ed. 1967). The court's legal
conclusion is presumed in its terminology.
20. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West 1970). Community property is defined to be "all
real property situated in this state and all personal property wherever situated ac-
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riage was void"' or voidable." Because these individuals, known
as "putative" spouses, believed in good faith that they were
married, courts have allowed them to recover based on their
expectation that they are entitled to half the "community
property." 3 But the California courts have declined to apply
the analogy to protect the meretricious spouse.
Vallera v. Vallera
In Vallera v. Vallera, the plaintiff cohabited with the
defendant for a period of at least three years beginning in May
quired during the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this state ....
Id. § 5110 (West Supp. 1975).
21. Feig v. Bank of Am., 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936) (husband unaware of
"wife's" secret divorce); Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339 (1931) (incestuous
marriage); Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920) (contrary to "wife's"
belief, her marriage to her former husband had never been dissolved); Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d 62, 89 P.2d 164 (1939) (failure to meet the requirement of solemnization).
22. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937) (marriage annulled on grounds that wife's prior marriage had not been dissolved as she believed it
had); Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911) (marriage annulled on grounds of
wife's physical incapacity).
The putative spouse's right to half the "quasi-marital" property upon dissolution
of the relationship was codified in 1970 in California Civil Code section 4452, part of
the Family Law Act. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1976). A putative spouse's
property rights upon the death of her spouse are still founded on case law. E.g., Feig
v. Bank of Am., 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936) (surviving putative spouse awarded all
the "community property"); Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485
(1970) (property rights of putative spouse when property must be divided between
herself and a legal spouse).
23. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 339-40, 191 P. 533, 535 (1920);
Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 675, 118 P. 441, 443 (1911). In Schneider the court stated:
[W]e agree with the Texas courts that the common-law rule as to the
consequences of a void marriage upon the mutual property rights of the
parties to it is inapplicable where the community property regime prevails. This conclusion is dictated by simple justice, for where persons
domiciled in such a jurisdiction, believing themselves to be lawfully
married to each other, acquire property as a result of their joint efforts,
they have impliedly adopted, as is said in the Texas case cited, the rule
of an equal division of their acquisitions, and the expectation of such a
division should not be defeated in the case of innocent persons.
183 Cal. at 339-40, 191 P. at 535.
It is interesting to note, however, that although courts labored to fulfill the expectations of putative spouses, purporting to grant them property rights by analogy to the
community property system, they refused to award putative spouses alimony. Amicus
Brief, supra note 13, at 9, citing Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 100, 69 P.2d
845, 847 (dictum stating that a putative spouse has no right to alimony). See Luther
& Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse, 24 HAST. L.J. 311
(1973). Putative spouses acquired their right to support with the enactment of Civil
Code Section 4455, part of the Family Law Act. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4455 (West Supp.
1976).
24. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
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of 1936.5 The plaintiff brought an action for separate maintenance and for a division of the community property, based on
an alleged common law marriage contracted in Michigan on
December 16, 1938.26 The trial court determined that the common law marriage had never existed.17 Alternatively, it found
that during the entire period of the cohabitation, the plaintiff
2
believed that the defendant was married to another woman.
The Vallera court, asked to extend community property
rights to a meretricious spouse,2 refused to do so, relying on a
previous decision, Flanaganv. CapitalNational Bank, ' " which
distinguished meretricious from putative spouses:
The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether a
woman living with a man as his wife but with no genuine
belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason
of cohabitation alone the rights of co-tenant in his earnings
and accumulations during the period of their reltationship.
It has already been answered in the negative. Equitable
considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of
the continuation of benefits attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith are not present in such a
case.3
The essence of the Vallera court's distinction between the
property rights of the putative and those of the meretricious
spouse was the difference it perceived in the reasonable expectations held by each. A putative spouse believes he or she is
married, and reasonably expects to receive the benefits necessarily incident to marriage. 32 However, the court considered a
similar expectation held by a meretricious spouse to be unreasonable. Knowing she is not married, a meretricious spouse
cannot expect to be accorded the protection of marital property
laws. 34 Justice Traynor's use of the phrase "by reason of
cohabitation alone"3" indicates that cohabitation, by itself, is
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Flanagan
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 683, 134 P.2d at 762.
Id. at 682, 134 P.2d at 761.
Id. at 682-83, 134 P.2d at 762.
Id. at 683, 134 P.2d at 762.
Id. at 684, 134 P.2d at 762.
213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931).
Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 684-85, 134 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1943), citing
v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684, 134 P.2d at 763.
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not to be considered equivalent to marriage; cohabitators who
lack the good faith of the putative relationship are not entitled
to the judicial relief afforded married couples through the community property laws solely because they are living together. '"
Nevertheless, the Vallera majority recognized that meretricious spouses may recover an interest in property accumulated without analogizing to marriage. 7 In dictum, the court
mentioned that an express agreement to pool earnings and
share equally in accumulations is enforceable." Similarly, the
court recognized that a meretricious spouse may recover a
share in property jointly accumulated "in the proportion that
her funds contributed toward its acquisition,"39 even if there is
no express agreement to that effect.4°
From Vallera to Keene
The appellate and supreme court cases decided between
the Vallera and Keene decisions discuss three theories of recovery for a meretricious spouse: (1) express arrangements either
to pool earnings and share in accumulations,4 or to compensate
for services rendered;" (2) implied contracts; 3 and (3) recovery based on consideration furnished for the acquisition of
property." Most of the cases purport to rely on Vallera and
36. Id. at 684-85, 134 P.2d at 762-63.
37. Id.at 685, 134 P.2d at 763.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Vallera opinion does not state whether the remedies mentioned for
meretricious spouses were meant to be exclusive. The court listed two valid grounds
for recovery without indicating whether or not other bases of recovery were to be
precluded. By not clearly indicating its intention, the court paved the way for later
appellate decisions which interpreted its listing of remedies to be all inclusive. See
Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948); Oakley v. Oakley,
82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
41. See, e.g., Weak v. Weak, 202 Cal. App. 2d 632, 21 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1962);
Ferguson v. Schuenemann, 167 Cal. App. 2d 413, 334 P.2d 668 (1959); Barlow v.
Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d 64 (1958); Croslin v. Scott, 154 Cal. App. 2d
767, 316 P.2d 755 (1957); Ferraro v. Ferraro, 146 Cal. App. 2d 849, 304 P.2d 168 (1956);
Cline v. Festersen, 128 Cal. App. 2d 380, 275 P.2d 149 (1954); Bridges v. Bridges, 125
Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Profit v. Profit, 117 Cal. App. 2d 126, 255 P.2d
25 (1953); Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
42. See Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951); Lazzarevich
v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948); Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App.
2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
43. See Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948);
Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
44. See McQuin v. Rice, 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 199 P.2d 742 (1948); Baskett v.
Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d 39 (1948).
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quote the dictum in the case as controlling law.4"
Express Agreement. California appellate courts were
liberal in recognizing express agreements to pool earnings and
share in accumulations during the relationship or to compensate for services rendered. All courts reiterated the rule set out
4"
in a pre-Vallera supreme court case, Trutalli v. Meraviglia,
that an express agreement will be enforced only if not founded
on the illicit relationship.47 However, this limitation was narrowly construed. In Bridges v. Bridges," the Third District
Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that it would consider an
agreement to be founded on the meretricious relationship
only if the parties expressly testified that that was the case.
The court stated:
Nowhere is it expressly testified to by anyone that there
was anything in the agreement for the pooling of assets and
the sharing of accumulations that contemplated meretricious relations as any part of the consideration or as any
object of the agreement.49
In fact, only one decision, Hill v. Estate of Westbrook,5"
refused to enforce an express agreement where the agreement
was pleaded. The supreme court in Hill denied recovery for the
value of the meretricious spouse's services, concluding that it
could not overturn as a matter of law the appellate court's
holding that the spouse's services were rendered gratuitously or
in contemplation of the illicit relationship. '" The appellate
court felt bound to reach that conclusion because the plaintiff
unwisely sought to recover for "living with [the decedent] as
man and wife" and "bearing decedent two children" as well as
"performing the usual duties of a housewife.""2 The court of
45. See, e.g., Cline v. Festersen, 128 Cal. App. 2d 380, 384, 275 P.2d 149, 152
(1954); Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 362, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (1954); Garcia v.
Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 369, 235 P.2d 89, 92 (1951).
46. 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1931).
47. Id. at 701-02, 12 P.2d at 431-32.
48. 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954).
49. Id. at 363, 270 P.2d at 71. The court also mentioned that an agreement could
be implied from the findings of fact. Id. at 362, 270 P.2d at 70. However, the majority
seemed to emphasize that neither party had testified that the agreement was founded
on the meretricious relationship; this fact was noted twice in the opinion. Id. at 36263, 270 P.2d at 71.
50. 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 602-03, 213 P.2d 727 (1950), aff d, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 247
P.2d 19 (1952).
51. 39 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 247 P.2d at 21.
52. 95 Cal. App. 2d at 600-01, 213 P.2d at 728. The appellate decision indicates
that the meretricious plaintiff would have been allowed to recover for the services she
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appeal had to assume that a portion of the money awarded was
to compensate the plaintiff for services which were definitely
based on the meretricious relationship. Consequently, the
state's policy against illicit relationships required that recovery
be denied."
Implied Contract. The second group of cases dealing with
remedies for meretricious spouses discusses recovery based on
a "contract implied-in-law" theory. Two appellate cases examined this possibility, but both concluded that it was inapplicable. 4
Quasi -contractual theory permits recovery in quantum
meruit for the value of services rendered without request, so
long as there is unjust enrichment and the services were
performed with an expectation of payment." Conceivably, a
meretricious spouse renders services with no expectation of
payment. Had the courts in the two appellate cases which discussed the possibility of a quasi-contract reached this conclusion, the holdings, if not persuasive, would at least be understandable."
However, the possibility of recovering on an implied conrendered which were not based on the relationship had the separate value of those
services been determined by the trial court. Id. at 603, 213 P.2d at 730.
53. Another indication of the courts' liberality in recognizing express agreements
is the findings of fact on which agreements have been based. Despite potential abuse,
agreements have been founded primarily on the testimony of the meretricious spouse
seeking recovery. Although evidence on almost all the issues was conflicting, the Third
District Court of Appeal in Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954),
found an express agreement on the basis of the plaintiff's statements and evidence that
she and the defendant purchased and improved property. Id. at 361-62, 270 P.2d at
70. In Cline v. Festersen, 128 Cal. App. 2d 380, 275 P.2d 149 (1954), the plaintiff's
testimony that in 1937 decedent told her "everything was to be 50-50" was construed
to be an oral agreement to pool earnings and property and share equally in all accumulations. Id. at 382-83, 275 P.2d at 150-51. Similarly, the court in Ferraro v. Ferraro,
146 Cal. App. 2d 849, 304 P.2d 168 (1956), found an express agreement to pool earnings
and to share in accumulations apparently based on the wife's testimony at the trial.
The Ferrarocourt rejected the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's statements regarding the alleged agreement were inconsistent, holding that the defendant was interpreting plaintiff's testimony too narrowly. Id. at 851, 304 P.2d at 170.
54. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948); Oakley
v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
55. D. Doaas, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 237 (1973); see Desny v. Wilder,
46 Cal. 2d 715, 735-37, 299 P.2d 257, 268-69 (1956); Santa Clara v. Robbiano, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 845, 848-49, 5 Cal. Rptr. 19, 21 (1960).
56. The vacated opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal in Hill v. Estate
of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950) is the only appellate decision
discovered which actually stated that one of the reasons meretricious spouses cannot
recover for services rendered on an implied contract theory is because of their inability
to establish an expectation of payment. Id. at 602, 213 P.2d at 729.
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tract was not dismissed because the courts found the meretricious spouses did not expect compensation. Rather, both courts
denied quasi-contract recovery because the plaintiffs had no
good faith belief in the marriage. 7
In Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich,5 8 the court supported its
holding denying a meretricious spouse recovery on an implied
contract with a quotation from Vallera: in dealing with meretricious spouses there are no "equitable considerations arising
from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits
attending the status of marriage entered into in good faith.""5
The court in Oakley v. Oakley,10 dismissed a quasi-contract
57. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 718-19, 200 P.2d 49, 55-56
(1948); Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 191-92, 185 P.2d 848-50 (1947).
58. 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948). Lazzarevich is particularly interesting because the plaintiff was both a putative and a meretricious spouse for different
periods of time. Id. at 712, 200 P.2d at 52. Plaintiff and defendant had married March
18, 1921. Later, marital difficulties arose and the defendant filed for divorce, the court
granting an interlocutory decree on March 18, 1932. The parties had a reconciliation
in July of 1935, and they lived for over ten years believing that they were married.
However, pursuant to written instructions from defendant's attorney, a final decree of
divorce had been entered on September 6, 1933, the existence of which first came to
their attention when further domestic difficulties prompted the plaintiff to consult an
attorney in 1945. From August 10, 1945, until the commencement of the action in
August of 1946, the plaintiff was aware that the defendant was not her husband.
Despite her discovery, she cohabited with him for eight more months during this
period. Id.
As a first cause of action plaintiff sought to recover the value of her services in
the home from her original reconciliation with the defendant in 1935 up until they
permanently separated in April of 1946. Id. at 710, 200 P.2d at 50. In dealing with her
claim, the Lazzarevich court distinguished between the years when she was a putative
spouse and the eight months when she was a meretricious spouse. Id. at 713-19, 200
P.2d at 52-56.
During the discussion leading up to the court's holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover for her years as a putative spouse, the court held that section 40 of
the Restatement of the Law of Restitution was applicable. Section 40 dealt in pertinent
part with recovery based on services rendered in reliance on a misstatement; the
section did not indicate that it was meant to be used exclusively by parties in a
domestic context. Id. at 715-16, 200 P.2d at 54. Consequently, the Lazzarevich court's
citation to the Restatement shows that it actually considered whether the plaintiff had
a legal basis on which to recover for her services, aside from her status as a good faith
spouse. That is, the majority compared the plaintiffs situation with the general requirements for quasi-contract recovery, and held that recovery was appropriate because the requirements were fulfilled.
In contrast, when the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for the value of her
services rendered as a meretricious spouse, it never squarely faced the issue of whether
the plaintiff fulfilled the requirements for recovery based on an implied contract.
According to the decision, the plaintiff's meretricious status was dispositive. Id. at 71819, 200 P.2d at 55-56.
59. Id. at 719, 200 P.2d at 55-56.
60. 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947).
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claim on the same reasoning.' Both decisions state that recovery is possible only if there is an express agreement. 2
The Lazzarevich-Oakley interpretation of Vallera rests on
the assumption that an expectation of payment is necessarily
an expectation of a benefit "attending the status of marriage"-an assumption that is clearly specious. A meretricious
spouse might reasonably expect compensation for services
quite apart from any dependence on marital rights. The status
of marriage is not a prerequisite to compensation for services
rendered in a non-marital context. Consequently, the courts
must have construed the Vallera decision to deny, as a matter
of policy, any recovery based on a meretricious spouse's services in the absence of an express agreement. The Vallera opinion, which dealt only with the applicability of marital property
laws, does not support such an interpretation.
Resulting Trust. The last remedy for meretricious spouses
dissussed by appellate decisions after Vallera is the possibility
of basing a recovery on consideration furnished for the purchase of property acquired during the relationship. The plaintiffs in both cases discussing this subject sought to have a resulting trust imposed upon the defendant's property. 3 The
court interpreted the requirements for a resulting trust very
strictly, perhaps indicating their general unwillingness to grant
a meretricious spouse relief.
In Baskett v. Crook 4 the Third District Court of Appeal
noted that in the absence of facts to the contrary, it is presumed that the holder of title to property is the owner. 5 The
court stated that a resulting trust may only be established
where there is clear and convincing evidence that it was the
intention of the parties to create a trust.6 Actually, the rule is
that resulting trusts are imposed for the purpose of carrying out
the parties' intentions-an entirely different proposition. 7
Consequently, it appears that the court imposed an additional
unprecedented requirement on the meretricious spouse, which
61. Id. at 191-92, 185 P.2d at 850.
62. Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 719, 200 P.2d 49, 56 (1948);
Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 192, 185 P.2d 848, 850 (1947).
63. McQuin v. Rice, 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 915, 199 P.2d 742, 743 (1948); Baskett
v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 362, 195 P.2d 39, 44 (1948).
64. 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d 39 (1948).
65. Id. at 362, 195 P.2d at 44.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Walrath v. Roberts, 12 F.2d 443, 445 (1925); Laing v. Laubach, 233
Cal. App. 2d 511, 515, 43 Cal. Rptr. 537, 539 (1965).
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she was unable to meet.
In reaching its decision, the Baskett court relied on
5 a case in which the court has indicated
Bertelsen v. Bertelsen,"
its disdain for meretricious relationships by concluding that
money contributed by the meretricious plaintiff was merely
consideration for prostitution or a gift. 9 Apparently, the
Baskett court held a similar view.
The court in McQuin v. Rice7" refused to impose a resulting
trust because none of the meretricious spouse's money could be
traced to the property in dispute.7' As in Baskett, the court
noted that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must
be assumed that the meretricious spouse's labor and contributions from his paycheck were intended as his share of the living
expense or as gifts.72
Keene v. Keene
In Keene v. Keene," plaintiff and defendant cohabitated
in a meretricious relationship for a period of 18 years." During
this time the plaintiff performed many duties in connection
with the defendant's business and commercial ventures as well
as household management and the customary chores of a
housewife."
At the end of the relationship plaintiff brought an action
68. 7 Cal. App. 258, 94 P. 80 (1907).
69. Id. at 260-61, 94 P. at 80.
70. 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 199 P.2d 742 (1948).
71. Id. at 918, 199 P.2d at 744.
72. Id. Thus, Baskett and McQuin in combination stand as a warning that meretricious spouses have difficulty establishing that their services were not intended as
consideration for prositution or gifts when attempting to recover on a resulting trust
theory.
73. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
74. Id. at 660, 371 P.2d at 330, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
75. Id. at 663 n.3, 669-70, 371 P.2d at 332 n.3, 336-37, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 596 n.3,
600-01. Evidence supported the fact that plaintiff undertook several additional jobs
while the couple lived on a ranch acquired by the defendant prior to the beginning of
the relationship. Id. From 1938 to 1946, the period that the couple lived on the ranch,
the plaintiff singly cared for a large commercial turkey flock. Id. at 669, 371 P.2d at
336, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 600. During the lambing season she nursed back to health
"orphan" lambs which otherwise would have died. Id. Furthermore, she helped the
working hands clear land for cultivation as well as helping with the sowing and harvesting of commercial crops. Id. at 670, 371 P.2d at 336-37, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 600-01.
In 1946 the defendant sold the ranch, vastly improved from the time of its original
purchase, for a very substantial sum. Id. at 670, 371 P.2d at 337, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
From that time until 1956 he engaged in real estate and furniture businesses. Some
evidence was presented that the plaintiff also helped with these ventures. Id. at 661,
670, 371 P.2d at 330, 337, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 594, 601.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

to "impress a trust upon defendant's property with respect to
the proceeds of an alleged joint venture or partnership between
defendant and herself." 8 Citing Vallera as authority, she contended that the trust should be imposed by reason of the duties
she had performed for the defendant in excess of such usual
spousal services as housekeeper, cook and homemaker."
The Keene court denied the meretricious spouse's claim,
concluding that her reliance on the Vallera opinion was misplaced. The majority held that a recovery in the form of a
resulting trust based on the plaintiff's personal services in the
defendant's businesses did not come within the ambit of the
Vallera rule."9 The court reiterated the dictum in Vallera that
a meretricious spouse is entitled to "share in the property
jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds contributed toward its acquisition," but concluded that services alone
were not valid consideration: "funds" meant money or property. 0
After dismissing the possibility that recovery was appropriate under Vallera, the Keene court ruled that the plaintiff
also was unable to fulfill resulting trust requirements established by other decisions.' Trust precedent required that the
plaintiff show the precise amount of consideration that she
paid as well as the total asset price." The court held that the
plaintiff could not meet this burden. 3 Furthermore, the majority noted that where services provide the consideration, those
services must have been performed for a grantor, who
subsequently transferred title to the grantee in payment. 4 The
plaintiff's services, performed for the grantee, clearly did not
satisfy these requirements."5 The court observed that services
justifying the imposition of a resulting trust must have been
76. Id. at 659, 371 P.2d at 330, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
77. Id. at 659-60, 371 P.2d at 330, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
78. Id. at 664, 371 P.2d at 333, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 663-64, 371 P.2d at 332-33, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. In support of this
interpretation of Vallera, the Keene court relied on the dictionary definition of
"funds," noting that one must assume that words are used in their most common
sense. Id.
81. Id. at 665-68, 371 P.2d at 333-36, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597-600.
82. Id. at 665, 371 P.2d at 333-34, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98. The Keene court stated
that a resulting trust may be imposed when either real or personal property is transferred to one party, if the consideration was provided by another. Id.
83. Id. at 665, 371 P.2d at 334, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
84. Id. at 666-67, 371 P.2d at 334-35, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99.
85. Id.
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furnished at or before the purchase of the property. Even monetary contribution toward improvements on previously purchased real property have never justified the impositon of a
resulting trust.8 6
Although most of the Keene majority's holding regarding
the imposition of resulting trusts is consistent with prior case
law, 7 the court's requirement that the grantor convey the property in payment for the beneficiary's services is an inaccurate
representation of precedent. In Dougherty v. CaliforniaKettlemen Oil Royalties, Inc.," cited by Keene, the plaintiff was
awarded a resulting trust on the basis of obtaining a permit to
prospect for oil and gas on recently reopened government
lands.8 9 To characterize the issuance of the permit as "payment" for the services rendered in procuring it is a strained
interpretation of the case. Similarly, the court in Stewart v.
Douglass ° imposed a resulting trust where the plaintiff discovered a valuable mine on vacant federal property.9 The mining
claim that was subsequently recorded was not placed in the
defendant's name in "payment" for the plaintiff's explorations."
The Keene court also considered and rejected other possible forms of recovery for the plaintiff. Discussing the merits of
contracts implied-in-fact and contracts implied-in-law, the
court suggested that both remedies would have been available
had the plaintiff complied with their requirements,93 but the
decision does not indicate which requirements were unfulfilled.
86. Id. at 667, 371 P.2d at 335, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 599. See Comment, Rights of the
Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 866 (1962).
87. See, e.g., Plass v. Plass, 122 Cal. 3, 13, 54 P. 372, 376 (1898) (general requirements); Woodside v. Hewel, 109 Cal. 481, 484-85, 42 P. 152, 153 (1895) (general requirements); Hellman v. Messer, 75 Cal. 166, 170, 16 P. 766, 768 (1888) (resulting trust
improper based on improvement); Neusted v. Skernswell, 69 Cal. App. 2d 361, 368,
159 P.2d 49, 52 (1945) (resulting trust improper based on improvement).
88. 9 Cal. 2d 58, 69 P.2d 155 (1937).
89. Id. at 62-63, 69 P.2d at 157-58.
90. 149 Cal. 511, 83 P. 699 (1906).
91. Id. at 514, 83 P. at 700-01.
92. The rule implied by cases like Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil
Royalties, Inc., 9 Cal. 2d 58, 69 P.2d 155 (1937), and Stewart v. Douglass, 148 Cal. 511,
83 P. 699 (1906), is that any services rendered by a meretricious spouse before the date
of acquisition of property which were contributed toward its acquisition will justify the
impositon of a resulting trust. Although there is no case precedent to substantiate the
argument, a "homemaking" meretricious spouse could argue that her services in the
home which "freed" her spouse to earn the purchase price of a particular asset should
justify a resulting trust recovery.
93. 57 Cal. 2d at 664-65, 371 P.2d at 333, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
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Examining the possibility of a contract implied-in-fact,
the Keene majority noted that recovery is appropriate only
where one party performs services for another with an expectation of payment under circumstances negating an inference of
a gift. In a footnote, the decision lists several cases to support
this point, none of which involve recovery for domestic work. 4
This suggests that recovery on an implied contract is limited
to cases where the spouse performs work beyond the normal
household duties. Since the plaintiff in Keene meets this requirement, it is unclear why recovery was denied. Possibly, the
court decided that the services were not rendered with an expectation of payment, applying the usual presumption in a
marital context that any services performed are intended as a
gift. 5 However, there is nothing in the opinion to support this
supposition." Consequently, the circumstances under which
recovery is appropriately based on a contract implied-in-fact
are a matter of conjecture.
The court's discussion regarding contracts implied-in-law
is equally unclear. To illustrate the requirements for recovery,
the court noted that a putative spouse can recover the reasonable value of her services in excess of the support provided her
if no "marital" property has been accumulated. 7 Since a meretricious spouse can never be a putative spouse by definition of
terms, the reference to the "putative" requirement implies that
meretricious spouses can never recover in quasi-contract.
The Keene court avoided discussing the principal
issue-whether it should have established new precedent and
allowed recovery by a meretricious spouse meeting the requirements for the remedy of quasi-contract. Because of the extensive services performed by the plaintiff in Keene, it is conceivable that quasi-contract would have been appropriate. The only
94. Id. at 664 n.4, 371 P.2d at 333 n.4, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597 n.4.
95. Compare 54 CAL. JUR. 2d 692, with Gjurich v. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 P. 464
(1913). In the Gjurich opinion the court noted that it may be inferred, in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, that pecuniary compensation is not expected when
one blood relative performs services for another. The court applied the inference to a
meretricious relationship. 164 Cal. at 432, 129 P. at 465.
96. At the end of the court's discussion of resulting trusts, the decision does hint
that there may be an implication that services performed by one cohabitor, in assisting
in the operation of the other's business or trade, may be either a gift or a contribution
toward their general living expenses. 57 Cal. 2d at 668, 371 P.2d at 336, 21 Cal. Rptr.
at 600. However, the court's comment appears to be an afterthought, and its separation
from the opinion's discussion of contracts implied-in-fact makes its pertinence questionable.
97. Id. at 664, 371 P.2d at 333, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
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difficulty, as with the contract implied-in-fact, would have
been establishing an expectation of payment."
The Keene Dissent
Justice Peters, dissenting, contended that the meretricious
spouse was denied recovery because the majority felt that she
had "sinned" by participating in the relationship. He urged the
court not to adopt a rule whereby the plaintiff would be denied
recovery even though the defendant had "sinned" in equal degree .
Peters criticized two aspects of the majority decision: the
court's misinterpretation of the Vallera holding and its discussion of resulting trusts. He observed that the Keene court misconstrued the dictum in Vallera relating to "funds contributed
toward . . . acquisition" of property.'"" The Keene majority
had concluded, primarily on the basis of a dictionary definition, that the term "funds" was meant to include money or
property but not "services."'"' Justice Peters correctly pointed
out that Vallera itself refutes that interpretation.
Two cases were cited by Justice Traynor in the Vallera
opinion to support the possibility of a recovery based on "funds
contributed." Both decisions, Hayworth v. Williams'"' and
Delamourv. Rodgers,'"' recognized services as adequate consideration.'°
Justice Peters noted that both Hayworth and Delamour
were based on sound theory and public policy. In view of the
fact that Vallera relied on the cases, Peters implied that recovery would have been allowed under a proper interpretation of
Vallera. Arguing that an illicit cohabitation should not invalidate an enforceable legal right, he concluded that a meretricious spouse should be entitled to a portion of the assets accumulated during the relationship on the basis of services contributed toward their acquisition.'0
98. See Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in
Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386 (1932); Wade, Restitutionfor Benefits Conferred
Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1966); Comment, Quasi-ContractsRelationships Raising Presumption of Gratuity, 6 FORD. L. REV. 417 (1937).
99. 57 Cal. 2d at 668-69, 371 P.2d at 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
100. Id. at 672, 371 P.2d at 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
101. Id. at 663, 371 P.2d at 332-33, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
102. 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909).
103. 7 La. Ann. 152 (1852).
104. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 672, 371 P.2d 329, 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
602 (1962).
105. Id.
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Justice Peters complained that the majority was overly
concerned with legal theories and criticized the highly technical discussion,' noting that the essential principle is one of
equity. Whether recovery is based on resulting trust, constructive trust, or equitable lien, the basic purpose is to "identify
and impress upon certain property the beneficial rights that
have arisen in an innocent party who in some way contributed
to the acquisition, protection, or improvement of that property
"107

Peters argued that the primary issue was whether consideration was furnished in whole or in part by one person and title
taken in the name of another.'"' He observed that under usual
contract and trust principles, consideration is recognized in the
form of money, property, or services, and no equitable principle
would justify the creation of a trust in favor of a person who
furnished money with which to purchase property that would
not also recognize the right of one who rendered services:'"9
[The creation of a trust] is an inference based on common
sense and on the implied intent of the parties. It certainly
does no lasting harm to the law to indulge in the mild
presumption that parties intend to deal fairly with each
other and that such presumption will be enforced by presuming the intent to create a trust."0
Clearly, Justice Peters felt that a trust remedy was denied because the majority inappropriately weighed the "sinfulness"
of the plaintiff in rendering its decision.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF CARY

Keene v. Keene"' was not successfully challenged for over
ten years. Then in 1973 the First District Court of Appeal decided In re Marriageof Cary,"' which announced that Keene
was no longer dispositive of the property rights of meretricious
spouses in a "family" relationship." 3 The Cary court held that
106. Id. at 673-74, 371 P.2d at 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
107. Id. at 674, 371 P.2d at 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 603, quoting Holder v. Williams,
167 Cal. App. 2d 313, 315, 334 P.2d 291, 292 (1959).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 674-75, 371 P.2d at 340, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
110. Id. at 674, 371 P.2d at 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 603. See Comment, Illicit
Cohabitation: The Impact of the Vallera and Keene Cases on the Rights of the Meretricious Spouse, 6 U.C.D.L. REV. 355 (1973).
111. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
112. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
113. Id. at 352-54, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67.
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the 1970 Family Law Act indicated a change in public policy,
discarding the "guilt" of meretricious parties as a consideration in the determination of property rights where the parties
shared a "family" relationship." 4 Accordingly, the Keene
"guilt" rationale had been undercut and its rule superseded.,"
In re Marriageof Cary
Paul Cary and Janet Forbes lived together for eight years
and had four children. Although they never married, they held
themselves out as a married couple, filing joint income tax
returns, purchasing a home, obtaining credit, and generally
transacting all business as husband and wife. Paul worked to
support the family while Janet cared for the house and children. Throughout the relationship, Paul recognized the children as his own." 6
The Cary court held that Paul's and Janet's cohabitation
constituted a family relationship within the purview of the 1970
Family Law Act." 7 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
act was intended to control the distribution of the family's
property."' Recognizing that California's community property
law ordinarily applied only to legally married parties, the court
observed that community property principles have been extended to putative spouses, and noted that California had historically denied relief to meretricious spouses based on the absence of "equitable considerations": dealing with "guilty parties," the courts left them in the position in which they had
placed themselves." 9
Persuaded that a new public policy had been announced
in the 1970 Family Law Act, the Cary majority held that the
guilt of Paul and Janet's "family-type" relationship was immaterial. Consequently, it upheld the trial court's division of the
property pursuant to Civil Code section 4800, which requires
2
equal division of community and quasi-community property.' 0
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 348, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.

Id.
Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
Id. at 349-50, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64.
Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
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Cary's Faulty Reasoning
In re Marriageof Cary is based on the erroneous conclusion
that the Family Law Act, by eliminating the consideration of
"sin" and "guilt" in determining the property rights of
parties
at dissolution of a marriage or a putative relationship, required
the courts to adopt the same approach when dealing with the
rights of a meretricious spouse. 2 ' An examination of the policy
underlying the Family Law Act reveals that the Cary decision
misapplied the Act's "no fault" concept to a meretricious relationship.
The 1966 report of the Governor's Commission on the
Family, which later became the basis of the Family Law Act,
suggests by exclusion that the "no fault" doctrine was meant
to be strictly limited to the marital context. In recommending
proposals for a change of the state's laws relating to the family,
the Commission had urged that:
the existing fault grounds of divorce and the concept of
technical fault as a determinant in the division of community property, support and alimony be eliminated, and
that marital dissolution be permitted only upon a finding
that the marriage has irreparably failed, after penetrating
scrutiny and after the parties have been given by the judicial process every resource in aid of conciliation. 22
Two articles subsequently written by members of the Governor's Commission make it clear that its "no fault" recommendations were directed only to the grounds for divorce, the
disposition of marital property, and the award of alimony and
support." 3 Neither makes any reference which would indicate
that property rights of meretricious spouses were meant to be
affected.24
The Commission's recommendations concerning the "no
fault" concept were adopted in the Family Law Act without
change,"' which presumably indicates that the legislature, too,
121. Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
122. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 1-2 (1966).
123. Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 31, citing Dinkelspiel & Gough, A Family
Court Act for Contemporary California:A Summary of the Report of the Governor's
Commission on the Family, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 363 (1967) and Kay, A Family Court: The
California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1205 (1968).
124. Id.
125. Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 31-32, quoting Krom, California'sDivorce
Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAC. L.J. 156, 170 (1970). The recognized
grounds for divorce were reduced from seven to two, "irreconcilable differences" and
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intended that the "no fault" policy be limited to marriages and
marital dissolutions. Cary's extension of the "no fault" concept
to a meretricious relationship was, therefore, in error.
Carrying this misconception to its logical conclusion, the
Cary court also decided that Civil Code section 445226 of the
Family Law Act defined the property rights of meretricious
spouses, although the statutory language is limited to putative
spouses.'27 Again, however, the legislative history behind Civil
Code section 4452 suggests the error of the interpretation. The
original recommendation of the Governor's Commission on the
Family was merely that the legislature codify the then judicially recognized property rights of a putative spouse.' No
mention was made of the rights of a meretricious spouse. In the
draft of the Family Law Act which was proposed in the Commission's report, the members incorporated their recommendations in sections 014b and 014c.111 The official comments in the
proposed draft following those sections stated:
Section 014b essentially codifies existing case law. .

.

. It

is the intent of the Commission that Sections 014b and
014c cover both the case of a marriage which is void because bigamous or consanguinous, and the case of an attempted marriage which is invalid because of failure to
"incurable insanity." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). More importantly, Civil Code
section 4800 was adopted which eliminates fault as a basis for dividing property.
Courts must now divide the community property and the quasi-community property
of the parties equally. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
126. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable
and the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith
that the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties
to have the status of a putative spouse, and, if the division of property is
in issue, shall divide, in accordance with Section 4800, that property
acquired during the union which would have been community property
or quasi-community property if the union had not been void or voidable.
127. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 352, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865-66
(1973).
128. Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 40, quoting REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY

at 46 (1966). The report stated:

It was the Commission's opinion that some protection was needed for a
good-faith spouse in a void marriage, especially one of long duration.
Though the property rights of a putative spouse are generally recognized
in present decisional law, it was deemed wise to spell out by statute the
right of such "innocent" spouse to an interest in the "quasi-marital property" and to support by analogy to the laws governing the division of
property and alimony in the case of valid marriages.

Id.
129.

REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY

at 75 (1966).
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meet the essential requirements of licensing or solemnization. 30
Eventually the Commission's recommendations were embodied in Civil Code sections 4452 and 4455.131 Soon after the
legislation was passed, the Executive Director of the Governor's Commission commented on the Family Law Act, comparing it to the Commission's original recommendations.'3 2 Noting
that the act in section 4452 gave statutory recognition to California case law protecting the putative spouse, he made no
reference to relationships between meretricious spouses.' 3 In
view of the recommendations made to the legislature and the
complete correspondence between those recommendations and
the literal interpretation of the sections, it appears that the
legislature had no intention of including anyone within the
ambit of 4452 but good faith putative spouses.'34
130.

Id. at 76.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding to have a marriage
adjudged a nullity or upon judgment, order a party to pay for the support
of the other party in the same manner as if the marriage had not been
void or voidable, provided that the party for whose benefit the order is
made is found to be a putative spouse.
132. Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 45-46, quoting Gough, Community Property
and Family Law: The Family Law Act of 1969, CAL LAW 273, 278-79 (1970).
133. Id. Besides commenting on section 4452, Executive Director Aidan Gough
commented on section 4455 and criticized its language. Subsequently, in 1970, the
legislature amended 4455 to conform with these criticisms. Amicus Brief, supra note
13, at 46-47, citing Cal. Stats. (1970), ch. 1545, at 3139 (West Leg. Serv.). This indicates that the legislature accepted Gough's interpretation of the code sections.
134. The Cary court interpreted Civil Code section 4452 so as to be consistent
with the "no fault" objective of the Family Law Act, although it meant giving the
section a meaning which the language does not suggest. In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal.
App. 3d 345, 351-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865-66 (1973). The court noted that section
4452 awards half the quasi-marital property to a spouse who has deceitfully led his
mate to believe they were married even though the property involved may have been
accumulated largely as the result of the efforts of the innocent party. Id. at 342, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 865-66. From this premise, the court concluded that it would be inconsistent to deny judicial aid to a meretricious spouse who had been honest with her mate
about their unmarried relationship. Id. Presuming that the legislature would not intend to create inconsistent provisions, the court held that section 4452 should be
interpreted in view of the new general "no fault" policy underlying the entire Family
Law Act. Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66. It was the intent of the Act to disregard
"guilt" in determining family property rights, according to the court,
and,
consequently, section 4452 should not preclude a "guilty" meretricious spouse from
recovery in view of the fact, that it guarantees half the property to a putative spouse's
equally "guilty" deceitful partner. Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
The core of the problem with the Cary court's reasoning regarding the proper
interpretation of section 4452 is its emphasis on the remedy the section provides for
meretricious cohabitators who have deceived their putative partners into thinking they

131.
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Post-CaryAppellate Decisions
Appellate decisions handed down after Cary have done
little to clarify the legal theories upon which a meretricious
spouse may base a recovery."' The first appellate opinion to
deal with a meretricious situation after Cary was In re Estate
of A therly.'31 The A therly majority agreed with the Cary result,
summarizing the reasoning of the earlier opinion with approval.'37 However, in the next appellate decision, Beckman v.
Mayhew, 3 ' the court declined to adopt the Cary rule, properly
was based on a misinterpretation
observing that the decision
3
Act.
of the Family Law
The most recent "meretricious" decision, Marvin v.
Marvin," is presently pending before the California Supreme
Court. Marvin is distinguishable from Cary because the plainwere married. Concededly, a "guilty" meretricious spouse would be allowed to retain
half the property upon the dissolution of a putative-meretricious relationship. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 4452 (West 1970); see note 126 supra. However, one can reasonably conclude from the structure of sections 4452 and 4455 that any relief afforded the meretricious spouse was incidental to the legislature's primary objective of defining the property rights of putative spouses; neither statute so much as mentions meretricious
spouses. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4452, 4455 (West 1970); see notes 126 & 131 supra. Accordingly, Cary's apparent emphasis on the property rights guaranteed to deceitful meretricious spouses in a relationship with a putative partner was misplaced. The majority
should not have used that aspect of the statute as a basis from which to construe the
meaning of the whole section.
135. An inventive attorney in Menchaca v. Hiatt, 59 Cal. App. 3d 117, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 607 (1976), tried to use Cary to argue that meretricious plaintiff Marina Lara
was plaintiff Erasto Menchaca's "spouse" and therefore entitled to recover under
Menchaca's insurance policy. Id. at 126, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The court held that the
rights under an insurance policy and the rights in jointly acquired property are sufficiently distinguishable to preclude its consideration and application of Cary. Id. at 126,
130 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The Menchaca majority noted that the case did not involve the
division of jointly acquired property upon the separation of two participants in a
meretricious relationship. Rather, it was concerned with the rights of a meretricious
spouse against a third party insurance company. Id. at 127, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
136. 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
137. Id. at 768-69, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 46-48.
138. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
139. Id. at 534-35, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 607. Alternatively, the Beckman court indicated that it might have been persuaded to reject the Vallera-Keene doctrine because
its policy of denying judicial relief to meretricious spouses on the basis of the "sinfulness" of the relationship was unrealistic in view of the social attitutes of the times. Id.
at 535, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
Few people would deny that social attitudes have drastically changed since the
time Vallera and Keene were decided. Compare the beliefs of the average American
today with the attitude of the Vallera appellate court. See note 1 and accompanying
text supra.
140. Marvin v. Marvin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 84 (1975), appeal docketed, No. 30520,
Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 17, 1975.
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tiff sought recovery on the basis of an express agreement to
contribute efforts and share earnings.' Nevertheless, the
Marvin appellate court rejected Cary, as Beckman had, on the
basis of its erroneous interpretation of the Family Law Act.'
The trial court ruled that the Marvin agreement was unenforceable because it was made in contemplation of the illicit
relationship. The appellate decision correctly noted that California precedent requires that agreements have an independent
basis.'
THE CONSENTING ADULTS BILL, ASSEMBLY BILL

489

Before the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 489,
adulterous cohabitation,'" sodomy,' and oral copulation'46
were crimes. The Consenting Adults Bill removed criminal
sanctions from adulterous cohabitation and private acts of sodomy and oral copulation between consenting adults.'47 But it
is probable that both the purpose and the effect of A.B. 489 are
more comprehensive than decriminalization of these acts. The
bill can be viewed as official recognition by the legislature that
relationships between consenting adults fall within an area of
activity that should be free from government sanction.
The Legislative Intent
The legislative intent behind the Consenting Adults Bill is
largely a matter of speculation; the legislature failed to draft
an official statement of its purpose in enacting the bill. Since
there also is no official record of the proceedings leading up to
the passage of A.B. 489, the legislative intent must be inferred
from the language of the bill itself and unofficial reports of the
141. Id. at 88.
142. Id. at 96-97.
143. Id. at 98. See, e.g., Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932);
Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
Marvin was not tried on the merits, the Second District Court of Appeal having
upheld the trial court's judgment on the pleadings. Marvin v. Marvin, 50 Cal. App.
3d 84, 88, 100 (1975). Consequently, it is not clear what significance the case will hold.
144. CAL. PEN. CODE § 269a (West 1970).
145. Id. § 286.
146. Id. § 288b.
147. Cal. Stats. (1975), ch. 71, at 144 (West Leg. Serv.). Criminal sanctions for
sodomy and oral copulation were retained:
(1) when the acts are committed with a minor or by force, violence,
duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; and (2) where the participants are confined in state prison or specified detention facilities.
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arguments which were instrumental in obtaining a legislative
majority.'48
The Consenting Adults Bill decriminalized private acts of
sodomy and oral copulation between consenting adults. This
public-private distinction would seem to indicate that the legislature was responding to a notion of privacy: private acts
between consenting adults are of less interest to the state than
those which are public. The reason for the distinction between
public and private acts is not explicit, but it is probable that
the legislature was recognizing that individuals have an overriding interest in being able to engage in a private relationship
with another adult free from government intrusion. Support for
this interpretation is provided by the bill's legalization of cohabitation, an activity with both a public and a private aspect.
The decriminalization of the only type of cohabitation which
was illegal, suggests that the prime motive of the legislature
was to acknowledge that all relationships between consenting
adults should be free from government intrusion.
In addition to the statutory language, a second indicator
of the legislature's purpose in enacting A.B. 489 is the arguments that were instrumental in obtaining the bill's passage.
Three arguments were reiterated as the bill passed through
committee and onto the floor for debate: (1) the police are not
capable of effectively enforcing laws against "victimless
crimes; ' (2) the benefits obtained from enforcing the laws
against oral copulation, sodomy, and adulterous cohabitation
are slight when compared with the cost of enforcement; and
(3) personal relationships are in an area of privacy where the
50
government should not intrude. Although it is impossible to
148. See note 150 and accompanying text infra.
149. As used in this context, "victimless crimes" are offenses in which there is
no direct manifestation of harm or loss to physical being or property. Letter from
Thomas H. Clarke, Jr., Counsel to the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, July
2, 1976 [on file with the SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
150. Thomas H. Clarke, Jr., is Counsel to the Assembly Committee on Criminal
Justice, the standing committee which considered A.B. 489. He was present when the
bill was discussed in committee as well as when it was debated on the floor. Clarke
stated that three main arguments were instrumental in passing the bill in the Assembly. First, it was argued that the police are not able to effectively enforce laws against
"victimless crimes." Second, a cost-benefit argument was made that the "benefits"
obtained from enforcing the laws against non-forceful oral copulation, sodomy, and
adulterous cohabitation were slight when compared with the cost of enforcement.
Third, the common law argument was made that a man's home is his castle: an
individual's activities in his own home are in a zone of privacy where the state should
not intrude without substantial cause.
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determine the extent to which the majority relied on any of the
three arguments in voting on the issue, all were persuasive to
some degree, and hence, the privacy argument can legitimately
be recognized as one of the legislative objectives in enacting the
bill.
The Consenting Adults Bill was authored by Willie Brown,
Assemblyman for the 17th District. While Assemblyman
Brown's opinion as to the legislative intent behind the bill is
not dispositive, his extensive involvement in the passage of the
bill gives his comments weight. Brown confirms that A.B. 489
was passed with the intent of officially recognizing that relationships between consenting adults are within an area of privacy which should be free from government sanction. According to Brown, the Consenting Adults Bill was meant to acknowledge that the state has adopted a policy of neutrality
with respect to private relationships between adult citizens. 5 ,
A further significant confirmation of the legislative intent
is the opinion of John Vasconcellos, the assemblyman who presented the privacy argument during the assembly debate and
was active in pushing the bill through the assembly. VasconcelClarke stated that in his opinion the "privacy" argument was the one which
pursuaded the majority of assemblymen to vote for the bill. Elaborating on the argument, he said that its underlying philosophy was that people should be free to carry
on any type of relationship as long as no one is harmed. Interview with Thomas H.
Clarke, Jr., Counsel to the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, in Sacramento,
Calif., Feb. 11, 1976 [a summary of which is on file with the SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
Verification of the arguments that were influential in pushing the Consenting
Adults Bill through the Senate was provided by John Jervis, a consultant to former
State Senator George R. Moscone when he was floor leader and the primary sponsor
of the bill. From his memory of the proceedings, Jervis recalled that three major
arguments were also made in the Senate: (1) "victimless crimes" laws should not be
enforced because they are a "waste" of law enforcement's time and resources; (2) private acts between consenting adults are in an area of privacy where the government
should not intrude; and (3) the state should not interfer with people's private relationships. Letter from John Jervis, consultant to Senate Democratic Caucus, July 7, 1976
[on file with the SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
151. Willie L. Brown, Assemblyman from the 17th District and author of the
Consenting Adults Bill, responding to questions regarding the legislative intent behind
the bill, agreed that A.B. 489 was passed by the legislature with the idea of officially
recognizing that relationships between consenting adults and activities conducted during these relationships come within an area of privacy which should be free from
government intrusion. Brown also verified that the Consenting Adults Bill was meant
to acknowledge that the state should no longer penalize consenting adults for the type
of relationships in which they choose to participate. Furthermore, Brown agreed that
the legislature did not intend to condone any particular types of relationships between
consenting adults, but it did intend that the state should be neutral toward them.
Letter from Willie L. Brown, Assemblyman from the 17th District, February 25, 1976
[on file with the SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
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los believes that the legislature intended to make it clear that
people have a right to relate to one another in any manner they
desire. The government has an affirmative duty to leave people
alone, absent a need to protect the young or those forcefully
approached. According to Vasconcellos, this right of individuals to relate freely to one another may be described in terms of
52
privacy, although the terminology is not imperative.'
EFFECT OF THE CONSENTING ADULTS BILL ON REMEDIES FOR
MERETRICIOUS SPOUSES

Both Justice Peters, dissenting in Keene, and the Cary
court argued that in California meretricious spouses have been
denied property rights because the courts have refused on principle to grant relief to persons engaged in a "sinful" relation"' The inadequate, even nonexistent reasoning displayed
ship. 53
in judicial opinions on the subject indicates that most often the
issue was decided on the grounds of a public policy against
assisting "sinful" cohabitators. The rule of law established by
these decisions should be reconsidered, in view of the new state
policy evidenced by the enactment of the 1975 Consenting
Adults Bill. 5 ' A.B. 489 indicates that the state has officially
152. Assemblyman John Vasconcellos from the 23rd District spoke out in favor
Consenting Adults Bill when it was debated on the Assembly floor. Vasconcellos
the
of
stated that he believed that the legislative intent behind A.B. 489 was to acknowledge
that it is "not the government's business what people do in their personal lives and
relationships, absent a need to protect someone like kids or people being forcefully
approached." The Assemblyman agreed that the legislature intended to recognize
that relationships between consenting adults are in an area of privacy where the state
should not intrude. According to Vasconcellos, the legislative intent can be put very
simply-the intent was that the law should "just leave people alone, condoning people's rights to relate however they want." Vasconcellos stated:
The Bill primarily dealt with acts rather than relationships. But the
philosophy behind the Bill was more a question of personal rights and
choices. Implicit in the personal rights argument is the relationship idea.
Relationships are a function of rights. If the rights are there the relationships are legal or at least not a matter of legitimate government concern.
Interview with John Vasconcellos, Assemblyman for the 23rd District, in Sacramento,
Calif., Feb. 11, 1976 [a summary of which is on file with the SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
153. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 668-69, 371 P.2d 329, 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
600 (1962) (dissenting opinion); In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 349-50,
109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (1973).
154. The legislature's amendment of Civil Code section 5118, CAL. CIv. CODE §
5118 (West 1970), and its enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act (S.B. 347), Cal.
Stats. (1975), ch. 1244, at 3439 (West Leg. Serv.), indicate that California is placing
less emphasis on the status of marriage than in the past. Before a 1971 amendment,
the earnings of husbands who were separated from their wives were considered community property. Since 1972, however, a husband's earnings while permanently sepa-
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acknowledged the private nature of personal relationships; the
state will no longer penalize adults for the type of relationship
in which they choose to participate. Consequently, the judiciary should no longer bar meretricious spouses from certain equitable remedies in the name of a policy that has been repudiated by the state legislature.
To assess A.B. 489's potential effect on the property rights
of meretricious spouses, the rules governing the availability of
various remedies will be re-examined.
Recovery Based on an Express Agreement
Both Vallera and Keene indicated that express agreements
to pool earnings and share in accumulations are enforceable., 1"
Appellate courts have liberally granted relief on express pooling agreements as well as agreements to compensate for services rendered. However, the appellate courts uniformly have
insisted that the agreements cannot be based on the illicit meretricious relationship.'
Although this requirement has been
narrowly construed, Marvin v. Marvin'57 indicates that its impact can be decisive.'
The Consenting Adults Bill should provide justification for
upholding all express agreements, even if they are founded on
the meretricious relationship. A.B. 489 in effect legitimatized
all meretricious relationships, insofar as it established that the
state has no interest in penalizing the parties. Consequently,
if the meretricious relationship itself is consideration for an
agreement, the agreement is no longer based on illegal considrated from his wife have been characterized as separate property. Compare CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5118 (West 1970), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1976).
Thus, the
legislature has deemphasized marriage, placing a premium on cohabitation.
Similarly, passage of the Uniform Parentage Act, Cal. Stats. (1975), ch. 1244, at
3439 (West Leg. Serv.), also lessens the potential effect of marriage by eliminating the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children incident to which the law
confers or imposes rights and obligations. Id. at 3439-41. From the effective date of S.B.
347, the parent and child relationship, determined without regard to the parent's
marital status, establishes a child's lawful status. Id. at 3440-41.
155. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 662, 371 P.2d 329, 332, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593,
596 (1962); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943).
156. See, e.g., Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 701, 12 P.2d 430, 431 (1932);
Croslin v. Scott, 154 Cal. App. 2d 767, 771-72, 316 P.2d 755, 758 (1957); Bridges v.
Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 363, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (1954); Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 364, 368, 235 P.2d 89, 92 (1951); Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d
599, 602, 213 P.2d 727, 729 (1950).
157. Marvin v. Marvin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 84 (1975) (vacated).
158. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
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eration. Mote importantly, A.B. 489 indicates that the courts
should not look to the morality of a living arrangement in
granting or denying relief. Thus, courts no longer can validly
refuse to enforce an express agreement because they construe
it to be founded on an immoral relationship.' 9
Recovery Based on Contribution
Four aspects of the portions of the appellate decisions and
the Keene opinion regarding recovery based on a meretricious
spouse's contributions are either fallacious or inadequate, and
consequently appear to be based on the court's unwillingness
to help "sinful" plaintiffs. These aspects should be changed to
reflect the state's new "no punishment" policy. In other respects the rules set out by the decisions should stand. 60
The district courts of appeal in Baskett v. Crook' and
McQuin v. Rice"' noted several valid requirements for the imposition of a resulting trust. However, the court in Baskett v.
Crook' 2 held that the meretricious spouse in the case had to
establish a clear intent to create the trust at the time the assets
in question were acquired 63-a requirement unsupported by
precedent." 4 The court further indicated its prejudice by citing
Bertelsen v. Bertelsen,' 5 thereby implying that meretricious
spouses have to overcome the inference that "funds" they con66
tributed were payment for prositution.'
The supreme court also reiterated established resulting
67
trust requirements in Keene v. Keene.' The crux of the Keene
holding has a clear basis in legal precedent: resulting trusts
have never been imposed in consideration of services rendered
159. There may be a problem with this analysis stemming from the Consenting
Adults Bill's failure to legalize prostitution. An agreement which is solely a contract
for prostitution will still be unenforceable. However, it is possible to distinguish an
agreement based on a meretricious relationship from one based on prostitution. Perhaps the continuing and extensive interaction between the spouses in a meretricious
relationship could be considered to be different than the money-for-sex bargain which
the law has tried to avoid. Alternatively, in the case of an express agreement to
compensate for services, the court could compensate the spouse for all the activities
she performed for her mate except for engaging in sexual relations with him.
160. 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d 39 (1948).
161. 88 Cal. App. 2d 914, 199 P.2d 742 (1948).
162. 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d 39 (1948).
163. Id. at 362, 195 P.2d at 44.
164. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
165. 7 Cal. App. 258, 94 P. 80 (1907).
166. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
167. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
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to improve property once it has been purchased.' But the
Keene court came to two dubious conclusions. The court misinterpreted Vallera to state that a meretricious spouse can recover in proportion to the consideration she has furnished toward the acquisition of assets during the relationship only
when the consideration is not in the form of "services.' ' ' 6 Justice Peters, dissenting, correctly pointed out that the Vallera
court in fact had implied that services are adequate as consideration.'° Furthermore, the Keene majority stated that resulting trusts only have been imposed when the grantor had conveyed property in payment for the benficiary's services.' 7 Contrary to the Keene holding, resulting trust precedent has not
required that any conveyance be in payment for services rendered.'72
The Keene decision's inaccurate interpretation and loosely
reasoned observations concerning the services which will justify
a resulting trust on a contribution theory suggest that the holding was based in part on the "guilt" policy rather than on legal
principles related to the resulting trust remedy. Since the Consenting Adults Bill repudiates that policy, this aspect of the
Keene rule has been superseded, and that fact should be acknowledged by the California courts.
In addition, if the new state policy indicates that the state
has no interest in punishing consensual relationships, then certainly a participant in a meretricious relationship seeking a
resulting trust remedy should not have to meet the Baskett v.
Crook'73 requirement that she establish that the parties intended to create a trust when other plaintiffs bear no such
burden.'7 Moreover, a meretricious plaintiff should not have to
refute the inference suggested by the Baskett court that the
relationship was actually prostitution. 7 '
168. See, e.g., Hellman v. Messer, 75 Cal. 166, 170, 16 P. 766, 768 (1888);
Neusted
v. Skernswell, 69 Cal. App. 2d 361, 368, 159 P.2d 49, 52 (1945). The other
technicalities
noted by the court are also an accurate statement of the law. See, e.g., Plass
v. Plass,
122 Cal. 3, 13, 54 P. 372, 376 (1898); Woodside v. Hewel, 109 Cal. 481, 484-85,
42 P.
152, 153 (1895).
169. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
171. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
173. 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P.2d 39 (1948).
174. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
175. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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Recovery on Implied Contracts
California courts have never dealt squarely with the issue
of quasi-contractual recovery for a meretricious spouse. No
case sets forth the requirements for the remedy and demonstrates that they cannot be satisfied by a meretricious spouse.
Instead, both Keene and the decisions of the courts of appeal
have denied recovery because the "equitable considerations
arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of
benefits attending the status of marriage" are absent in the
case of a meretricious spouse. 7 ' The analysis assumes that expecting compensation for services rendered during a relationship necessarily is expecting a benefit "attending" the status
of marriage. This assumption simply cannot be supported. As
Justice Peters remarked, it is entirely reasonable and proper for
persons to expect fair treatment in their dealings with others,
and it is the business of the courts to apply available equitable
remedies to achieve that result.'77 The flat prohibition against
quasi-contractual recovery for a meretricious spouse is the
product of the courts' consideration of the "sinfulness" of the
relationship, and the Consenting Adults Bill would justify revising the rule to allow recovery on a contract implied-in-law
theory in any case where the general requirements for the remedy are met.
The same analysis is applicable to claims for recovery
based on a contract implied-in-fact theory, which the Keene
court conceded would be available to a plaintiff who fulfilled
the requirements.' 78 With the policy and consideration
difficulties solved by the demise of the erroneous Keene rule,
there is no reason why a meretricious spouse should not, in a
79
proper case, recognize and enforce an implied contract.'
176. See notes 29-36, 57-61, 97 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 106-10 and accompanying text supra.
178. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
179. A contract implied-in-fact theory might allow a meretricious spouse to recover half the property accumulated during the relationship under certain circumstances. Civil Code section 1621 states that both the existence and the terms of an implied
contract are manifested by the conduct of the contracting parties. CAL. CIv. CODE §
1621 (West 1973). It is conceivable that meretricious spouses attempting to carry on a
relationship without the potential problems created by divorce and alimony, may
manifest through conduct their actual expectation that the property accumulated will
be divided equally. An equal division may seem equitable to the parties because they
both have contributed all their time and effort to the relationship, although there may
be a discrepancy in the "market" value of each of their services.
Obviously, there would be a problem in establishing that both parties to the
relationship actually expected to equally divide the property. The most valid indica-
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Recovery in a "Family" Situation
The Cary decision, which permitted equal division of accumulated assets under the provisions of the Civil Code, was
based in part on the premise that meretricious spouses had
been refused the protection of California's community property
laws because of the illicit status of the relationship."" If that
were true, then perhaps the policy behind the Consenting
Adults Bill, which does effect the policy change Cary erroneously attributed to the Family Law Act, would justify the
Cary result: equal division of the assets of a meretricious couple. However, Cary's premise does not appear to be well
founded. Vallera denied a meretricious spouse an interest in
half the property accumulated because she did not have the
expectations of a married spouse. By reason of cohabitation
alone, the court held, the spouse does not have a reasonable
expectation of receiving the benefits of marriage.' That is, she
cannot reasonably expect to enjoy the benefit of the community property laws.
If a spouse is married, she can expect to receive half the
property accumulated in the relationship solely because she is
married; half the property has arbitrarily been allocated to her,
regardless of the value of any contributions she has made during the relationship.'8 2 A meretricious spouse, on the other
hand, does not, by virtue of cohabitation, qualify for the artificial property rights guaranteed by the community property
laws of the state, anymore than she qualifies for workmen's
compensation or any other statutory right with stated prerequisites. Consequently, she cannot validly claim that she has
been penalized for the "sinfulness" of her conduct because she
has not been allowed to recover half the property. Like any
other party in a non-marital situation, a meretricious spouse
must prove that she has some right to half the property on the
basis of consideration she has provided. To deny a meretricious
spouse relief if she fails to do so involves no policy of punishtors of the necessary expectation would be each party's equal time investment and
consistent efforts evidencing fair dealing. In addition, if the parties were engaged in a
"family-type" relationship this might indicate that they intended to adopt a
"community-property" type property division as the most equitable in a "community
effort" family situation. They may have chosen to remain unmarried only to avoid the
legal problems inherent in divorce and alimony, for example, if both spouses had a bad
experience going through a previous divorce.
180. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 29-36 and accompnying text supra.
182. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
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ment, and is perfectly consistent with the professed neutrality
of the state on the moral issue. Cary is still bad law.
CONCLUSION

Although the new "no punishment" policy embodied in
the Consenting Adults Bill may open up the full spectrum of
legal remedies to meretricious spouses, a very real problem still
confronts them: fulfilling the legal requirements for these remedies is difficult for a plaintiff in a domestic context. Certainly,
a major obstacle will be establishing that services were rendered with a legally cognizable expectation of payment. The
business-like outlook which a meretricious spouse would have
to take in order to assure evidence of the type of expectation
courts appear to demand is something people attempt to exclude from their private personal lives.
Justice Peters, in his Keene dissent, implied that the
major way in which meretricious spouses have been punished
for their status is in the courts' refusal to exercise their broad,
83
remedy-shaping equitable powers to assist such plaintiffs.
However, if courts are too lenient and allow a meretricious
spouse to recover property without insisting upon a legally acceptable basis for recovery, they are effectively legitimizing
4
marriage by consent, which is not recognized in California."
The court must strike a balance, permitting meretricious
spouses to recover whatever interest in accumulated assets
they have "earned," while prohibiting any artificial recoveryof-right analogous to the property settlement required by the
community property laws upon the dissolution of a marriage.
In this way, unjust enforcement will be prevented, but those
individuals who have specifically chosen to avoid marital obligations will be able to continue to do so.
Paul H. Miller
183.
184.

See notes 106-10 and accompanying text supra.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970).

